userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings
authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Sat, 6 Dec 2014 00:14:19 +0000 (18:14 -0600)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 8 Jan 2015 18:27:48 +0000 (10:27 -0800)
commit7d9436876e6e8b1f9e1e5eeb42a6081e29aadc52
tree13a81a2914e13dae44269356ef94dac4d2a3844f
parent41f3d9fb911ed645e453b23dff3bb4fcb1190ca7
userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.

As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.

For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality.  This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c

Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups.  Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.

For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kernel/user_namespace.c